Is it Easier to Prove Theorems that are Guaranteed to be True?

Rafael Pass & Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam

Presented by Yizhi Huang & Jiaqian Li


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
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
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Equivalently, if **NP** is hard on average, then either OWF exist, or **TFNP** is hard on average.

Interactive puzzles




Interactive puzzles



- **Completeness.** There exists an (inefficient) attacker $\mathcal{A}(1^n)$ that succeeds in making $\mathcal{C}(1^n)$ accept unless with negligible probability.
- Computational Soundness. There does not exists PPT attacker A^{*}(1ⁿ) that succeeds in making C(1ⁿ) accept with inverse polynomial probability.
- **Public Verifiability.** Whether $C(1^n)$ accepts is a deterministic poly-time function over the transcript $(m_1, p_1, \ldots, m_k, p_k)$.


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
Remark. Negligible can be changed to 1/3.

Interactive puzzles (optional properties)




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



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
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- *k*-round if the attacker and the challenger send *k* messages in total (for example, the above diagram is 2*t*-round).
- **Public-coin** if the challenger only sends her randomness in each round. (The attacker can perform all computation instead.)
- Perfect completeness if there exists an attacker \mathcal{A} that always succeeds in making $\mathcal{C}(1^n)$ output 1.









(m, p) is an **NP** relation (because of public-verifiability).


• The existence of a 2-round puzzle is syntactically equivalent to the existence of a hard-on-average search problem in **NP**.




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- Perfect-completeness iff the problem is *promise-true*. (Promise-true here means we restrict the problem the instances that have a solution, but does not mean the search problem is total. Examples include **TFNP** and inverting OWF.)
- If the puzzle is both public-coin and perfectly complete, then the hard-on-average problem is in TFNP.

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Comparison to interactive proofs

- In interactive proofs, the verifier and prover get an instance x of a language L, but in puzzles, the attacker and challenger do not.
- In interactive proofs, the prover for soundness can be computationally unbounded, but in puzzles, the attacker for soundness is computationally bounded.
- In interactive proofs, the difference between completeness and soundness arises from whether x ∈ L, whereas in puzzles, it arises from the difference in the computation power of attackers.

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Step 1/4: from hard-on-average problems to puzzles


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Lemma. If an **NP** problem *L* is hard on an efficiently-samplable distribution \mathcal{D} , then there exists an **NP** problem *L'* that is hard on the uniform distribution.

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We want to prove:

- a 2-round public-coin puzzle \Longrightarrow
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
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Attacker
$$\mathcal{A} \xrightarrow{r}$$
 Challenger \mathcal{C}


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It can be proven that there exists a way to select z_1, \ldots, z_ℓ such that the completeness is perfect and the soundness still holds.

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Step 3/4: round reduction

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
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
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
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The proof actually works for k-round to (k - 1)-round for any polynomial k(n). For simplicity, we only consider k = 3.






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
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
Perfect completeness. Trivial. **Soundness.** False.

[Babai-Moran'88] round reduction




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
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Soudness. [BM88] showed that the transformation preserves soundness in their context of computationally-unbounded $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A}'$, but in our setting, soundness is for PPT $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{A}'$.




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
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
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
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
can output p_2^i . But what if $r \notin \{s^1, \ldots, s^m\}$?



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
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Then, \mathcal{B} lets $(q_1, q_2^1, \ldots, q_2^m) := \mathcal{A}^*(t^1, \ldots, t^m, z')$ and outputs q_2^j .



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In the last round, \mathcal{B} uses the inverter *Inv* to produce a transcript of \mathcal{A}^* and \mathcal{C}' that is consistent with (p_1, r) , and uses the output of \mathcal{A}^* corresponding to r as the output of itself.

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That is, for any PPT T,

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Lemma. Existence of distributional OWF implies existence of OWF.

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
Proof overview

Main result. If **NP** is hard on average and OWF don't exist, then **TFNP** is hard on average.

```
\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{NP} \text{ is hard on average} \\ \checkmark \Downarrow \\ \mathsf{There exists a 2-round public-coin puzzle} \\ \checkmark \Downarrow \\ \mathsf{There exists a 3-round public-coin puzzle with perfect completeness} \\ \checkmark \Downarrow \qquad (\mathsf{Assume OWF don't exist}) \\ \mathsf{There exists a 2-round public-coin puzzle with perfect completeness} \\ \Downarrow \\ \mathsf{TFNP} \text{ is hard on average} \end{array}
```

Step 4/4: TFNP-hardness-on-average from puzzles

There exists a 2-round public-coin puzzle with perfect completeness \implies **TFNP** is hard on average



Straight-forward from definition.

Proof overview

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A caveat: infinitely-often

Main result: **TFNP** is hard on average in Pessiland.*

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What we actually proved in the round-reduction step is, for every n, if there exists a 3-round puzzle (with some properties) with security parameter 1^n , then there exist either OWF with security parameter 1^n , or 2-round puzzles with security parameter 1^n .

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What we actually proved in the round-reduction step is, for every n, if there exists a 3-round puzzle (with some properties) with security parameter 1^n , then there exist either OWF with security parameter 1^n , or 2-round puzzles with security parameter 1^n .

Therefore, even if 3-round puzzles exist for all sufficiently large n, we can only get the following:

- Either OWF exist for all sufficiently large *n*, or 2-round puzzles exist for infinitely many *n*.
- Either OWF exist for infinitely many *n*, or 2-round puzzles exist for all sufficiently large *n*.

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Is it Easier to Prove Theorems that are Guaranteed to be True?

Rafael Pass & Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam

Presented by Yizhi Huang & Jiaqian Li

2024-02-15

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Helmstedt, Holy Roman Empire, 1799.

Helmstedt, Holy Roman Empire, 1799.



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Carl Friedrich Gauss



Johann Friedrich Pfaff

Helmstedt, Holy Roman Empire, 1799.



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• Trying to embarrass Gauss, Pfaff gives Gauss a hard proposition x, and asks him to either provide a proof w for x, or claim x is false.

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- So the question is: are promise-true NP search problems easier than NP search problems?

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- Both inverting OWF and **TFNP** are promise-true!

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- Both inverting OWF and **TFNP** are promise-true!
- Therefore—



NO.

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